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COMPONENTS OF EMINENT DOMAIN: AN
ANCIENT TOOL FOR CONTEMPORARY USE
Legal principles, like metals, assume different forms and
attain various degrees of strength when submitted to practi-
cal tests to measure their usefulness. Following such tests,
analysis can be made to determine future adaptability in
various situations, and useful application.
For centuries the power of eminent domain has been sub-
mitted to various tests to determine its value in organized
society. Its usage has had an immeasurable influence on the
physical growth and development of our resources, industries,
and communities. Accordingly, this power has materially
guided the economic development of our nation. Obviously,
such a dominant factor has had a parallel effect on our people
and way of life.
To grasp fully an understanding of this concept, it is not
only noteworthy to learn the historical origin and evolution
of its development, but it is mandatory if the present day use
of eminent domain powers is to be accurately interpreted.
DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL REVIEW
In its absolute state, eminent domain is the power of the
sovereign to appropriate property for public use without the
consent of the owner.' Expressed differently by hundreds of
courts in the United States since colonial days, the definition
basically contains only these components: (1) power of the
sovereign to take (2) without the owner's consent (3) for
public use.
Today, this definition necessarily includes a fourth com-
ponent: just compensation for the land taken. This accepted
limitation, however, does not stem from the absolute power of
eminent domain, but is a limitation to its valid exercise. In
the relationship of condemnation and compensation, it is uni-
versally recognized that when private property is taken
through eminent domain proceedings, compensation will be
1. United States v. Certain Property in the Borough of Manhattan,
306 F.2d 439, (2d Cir. 1962); Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385 (N.D.
Ohio 1888); Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Kirkendall,
415 Dl. 214, 112 N.E.2d 611 (1953); Groff v. Bird-in-Hand Turnpike,
128 Pa. 621, 18 Atl. 431 (1889).
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included in the definition and in application;2 it ia not, how-
ever, an element of its basic definition.'
Definitions are only a stepping stone to understanding.
Accordingly, the implicit complexities inherent in the eminent
domain power render a concise definition almost useless in
terms of practical application. It is important, therefore,
that those who would applaud its virtues or condemn its evils
understand the personality of its powers.
The basic concept of eminent domain may be found in the
Old Testament and in Greek literature.4 During the Roman
Empire, Emperor Diocletian exercised eminent domain
powers to appropriate property that fell within the rights-of-
way of his famous aqueducts for the baths of Rome 5 In 302
A.D., however, the rights of private individuals were of little
or no import to such governmental action.
It was not until 1625 that the taking of private property
for public use as a distinct governmental power was analyzed
2. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 27 L.Ed. 1015 (1883); Bailey
v. Housing Authority of Bainbridge, 214 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812
(1959); Lafayette Hotel v. County of Eire, 26 Misc,2d 755, 205 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1960); Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 15 N.C. 465, 74 S.E.
460 (1912); Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 Pa. 141, 81 Atl.
143 (1911); Lindsay v. East Bay St. Comm'rs, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796).
3. See 1 THAYER, CASES ON CONITUTIONAL LAW 953 (1895) "But
while this obligation [i.e., compensation for property taken by the sov-
ereign] is thus well established and clear, let it be'particularly noticed
upon what grounds it stands, vi-., upon the natural rights of the ind..
vidual. On the other hand, the right of the state to take springs from
a different source, viz., a necessity of government. These two, therefore,
have not the same origin; they do not come, for instance, from any
implied contract between the State and the individual that the former
shall have the property, if it will make compensation; the right is
no mere right of pre-emption, and it has no condition of compensation
annexed to it, either precedent or subsequent. But there is a right
to take, and attached to it as an ingident, an obligptign to make com-
pensation; this latter, morally speaking, follows the other like a shadow,
but it is distinct from it, and flows from another source.'
4. In 1 Kings 21 the apprpriation of NabQth's vineyard by Ahgb,
King of Israel (875-53 B.C,) is recorded. When money or another
vineyard was refused, Jezebel secured it by causing Naboth and his
sona to be executed on a false charge p blasphemy.
In the Athenian Constitution by Aristotle the quarrel between Eleusis
and Athens was settled by several conditions inoluding the following:
"If any of the seceding party [i.e., discontented Athenians] wished to
take a house in Eleusis, the people would help them to obtain the
consent of the owner; but if they could not Dome to te mp, they should
appoint three valuers on either side, and the owner should receive what-
ever price they should appoint." II ENcyroiPIA BIITNNicA, ARISToTLE
(1952).
5. Rokes, An Analysis of Proper T Valuation Systems Under Emi-
nent Domain, Occasional paper No. 5, Bureau of Bus. & Eco. Research,
Mont. State Univ. p. 8 (Jan. 1961).
[Vol. 15
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and given the term dominium eminens (eminent domain). 6
Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and originator of the term
declared:
... the property of subjects is under the eminent domain
of the state, so that the state or he who acts for it may
use and even alienate and destroy such property, not
only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even
private persons have a right over property of others,
but for the end of public utility, to which ends those who
founded civil society must be supposed to have intended
that private ends should give way. But it is to be added
that when this is done, the state is bound to make good
the loss to those who lose their property .. . 7 [Emphasis
added.]
Over 340 years later the definitions of our courts will not
materially differ from the version of Grotius. Acknowledging
that the general use of the term has been constant since its
defined birth, the true significance of its meaning comes from
a review of its application in terms of power and philosophy
of existence.
It has been said that the state's power of eminent domain
is a reserved right "attached to every man's land"8 recognizing
"that the state might resume deminion over the property
whenever the interest of the public or the welfare of the state
make it necessary." 9 Those courts who subscribed to this
theory believed that the state had original and absolute owner-
ship of all property held by individuals, and the individual's
possession of the property was subject to a continuous reser-
vation that the sovereign might resume possession any time
the necessities of the public so deemed. Since the ultimate
power of the sovereign came from the public, the repossession
of the land was only a reversion to the original owners.
Several states adopted this interpretation in their courts10 and
the same concept can be found in constitutional phraseology.1
6. 1 NICHOLS, THE LAw op EMINENT DoMAIN §1.12(1) (3d ed.
Sackman & VanBrunt 1950).
7. Ibid.
8. Todd v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78, 87 (1867).
9. Haig v. Wateree Power Co., 119 S.C. 319, 112 S.E. 55, 57 (1921).
10. Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9 (1867) ; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler,
199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927); Shelton v. Shelton, 225 S.C. 502,
83 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
11. S.C. Const. art. XIV, §3 (1895); N.Y. Const. art. 1, §10 (1894);
Wis. Const. art. IX §3 (1848).
1963]
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This philosophy would seem to break down, however, when
new states are created after the land is acquired by individ-
uals, as was the case in the transition from colonies to states.
Since eminent domain has the power over all personal and
private property,12 the ownership or right of repossession
over tangibles and intangibles not yet in existence would
seem not to support a theory of the sovereign's prior own-
ership.
Today, however, the prevailing view is that the power of
eminent domain is an attribute of the sovereign "as a neces-
sary and inseparable part thereof."'1 Most courts feel this
interpretation emerges as a political necessity and needs no
additional justification.' 4 The concept of sovereignty has
also been supported by the principles of natural law: granted
that the sovereign does, indeed, have the power of eminent
domain as a sovereign right, yet its power is subject to a
reciprocal inherent individual right vested with each indi-
vidual which requires the recognition of compensating the
owner for property taken.' 5
It is interesting to note that the term "eminent domain"
was a phrase not known to English law as we understand
its usage. The doctrine as expressed in England and Canada
was applied only in the exercise of the sovereign to enter
lands for the defense of the realm.'0 The actual phrase
"eminent domain" as understood in English law was the own-
ership or dominion of an independent sovereign over the
territories of his sovereignty, by virtue of which no other
sovereign could exercise jurisdiction.Y7 The only technical
12. Bronx Chamber of Commerce v. Fullen, 174 Misc. 524, 21 N.Y.S.
2d 474 (1940); Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120
N.E.2d 719 (1954).
13. People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Co., 47 Cal. App.2d
393, 118 P.2d 47, 49 (1941).
14. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 37 L.Ed. 170 (1892);
Kohl v. United States, 96 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449 (1875); Hoffman v.
Stevens, 177 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Pa. 1959); Tinnerholm v. State, 179
N.Y.S.2d 582 (1958); Atkinson v. Carolina P. & L. Co., 239 S.C. 150,
121 S.E.2d 743 (1961); Riley v. State H'wy Dept., 238 S.C. 19, 118
S.E.2d 809 (1961).
15. Young v. McKenzie 3 Ga. 31 (1847); Henery v Dubuque R.
Co., 10 Iowa 540 (1860); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129
(1839); Gardner v. Village of Newburg, 2 Johns Ch. R. 162 (N.Y.
1816). See Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent
Domain, 6 Wis.L.REv. 67 (1931); Lenhoff, Development of the Concept
of Eminent Domain, 42 CoL.LREv. 598 (1942).16. See George v. Consolidated Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 411, 89 Atl.
635, 637 (1914).
17. 1 NICHOLS, op cit. supra note 6, §1.12(3).
[Vol. 15
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term approximating "eminent domain" as we understand the
term is "compulsory powers." These powers are granted by
acts of Parliament to enable municipal and other corpora-
tions to take property for their use.' Although this power,
in theory, established a form of eminent domain by the time
of the American Revolution, the limitation for taking private
property as understood in this country has never been rec-
ognized in English law.' 9 It must be remembered in any
comparative analysis of American and English jurisprudence,
that England is not bound by a constitution. Acts of Parlia-
ment are construed by the courts only in their meaning
whereas acts by Congress or state legislatures are scrutinized
for their constitutionality.
As far as the necessity of eminent domain powers were
concerned in the American colonies, the appropriation of
property for public use was primarily limited to the estab-
lishment of roads, dams, or grist mills. Obviously, the land
in most instances was unimproved, and consequently, no duty
was recognized to compensate the owner for any loss. 20
Because many colonial charters reserved rights for such im-
provements as highways when land was granted, litigation
seldom resulted from such takings.2' Eventually, however, as
the power was exercised more frequently, compensation for
the property taken was recognized in all the colonies except
one - South Carolina. Long after the Revolution, South
Carolina not only appropriated private property for highways
without compensation, but also used such materials from
adjoining land as was necessary for construction on strictly
a gratis basis. 22
Although the colonies exercised eminent domain power for
some private uses and had statutes authorizing such takings
18. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOA iN 7 (1st ed. 1894).
19. 1 NicHoLs, op cit. supra note 6, §1.21(5). See also Welch v.
T.V.A., 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939).
20. 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, §§1.22(1)-(14).
21. For a historical review see State v. Hudson Co. Bd., 55 N.J.L.
88,25 Atl. 322 (1892).. 22. State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100, 102 (S.C. 1836) "Until this question
was gravely made in this case, I had supposed it was a question well
settled in the law of this State, that the Legislature had the power
to order roads to be opened, and to use so much timber, earth, or rock,
as was necessary to keep the roads in repair; and to do this contrary
to the will of the owner, and without making previous compensation."
The court permitted the taking, however, based on precedent and that
the power of eminent domain "is a tacit condition of every grant made
in the State." 3 Hill at 105.
1963]
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for mills 23 and roads,24 the obligation to make compensation
was recognized as a moral obligation by all colonial govern-
ments, except South Carolina, by the time of Revere's ride.
It was assumed that when the colonies shed the Union Jack
for the Stars and Stripes, their respective status as states
included the sovereign powers previously reserved to the King
and Parliament. Blazing the comparatively virgin path of
democracy, the eminent domain powers of the sovereign were
actually a reservation of power in the hands of the people
who in turn, spoke through the authority of the legislature.2 5
When new states joined the Union, they automatically ob-
tained the same sovereign power subject only to the constitu-
tional prohibitions they desired to impose in the formation
of their procedural and substantive law.26
Since it was acknowledged that eminent domain powers
were absolute, no constitutional recognition was necessary.
But as an unlimited power, imposed limitations were deemed
necessary; especially in a nation fresh from the battle fought
in the name of individual rights. The limitations imposed
on eminent domain powers found in the Constitution of the
United States and the several state constitutions are chiefly
limited to the restrictions (1) that no person shall be de-
prived of his life, liberty, or property without due process
and (2) that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
Accordingly, the fifth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States27 limits eminent domain powers; it in no
way confers powers. In this case it is a limitation on the
powers of the United States only and not on the states.
28 It
23. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 28 L.Ed. 889 (1884).
24. See Matter of Hickman, 4 Harr. 580 (Del. 1847); Robinson v.
Swope, 12 Bush 21 (Ky. 1876); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 142 (N.Y. 1843).
25. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 U.S. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819).
See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877) "When
the people of the United Colonies separated from Great Britain, they
changed the form, but not the substance of their government. They
retained for the purposes of government all the powers of the British
Parliament and through their constitution or other forms of social com-
pact undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary
for the common good and security of life and prosperity." 94 U.S. at 124.
26. Cincinnati v. Louisville R. R., 223 U.S. 390, 56 L.Ed. 481 (1911);
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 55 L.Ed. 853 (1910).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V: ".. . nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
28. Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 193 U.S. 189, 48 L.Ed.
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is generally recognized that the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibits the states from authorizing the taking of private prop-
erty for private use, or without compensation under the "due
process" interpretation. 29 Similar provisions appear in every
state constitution, except North Carolina and New Hamp-
shire.3 0 These states, however, are bound to award compen-
sation for private property taken for public use under the
inclusiveness of the fourteenth amendment.3 1
Through such judicial reasoning, cases concerning the con-
stitutional powers must be determined on whether or not
some constitutional provision has been violated, rather than
questioning the sovereign authority.3 2 It should be empha-
sized that the constitutional provisions are not in any way to
be interpreted as a grant of authority, since the power of
the legislature (i.e., the people) is unconditional; the con-
stitutional provisions are, consequently, only limitations. 33
Thus, the sovereign acting through its legislature may de-
termine when the exercise of the eminent domain power is
necessary,3 4 what property is to be taken,35 the extent of the
taking,3 6 and the mode of acquisition.3  Accordingly, the
sovereign may delegate the power of eminent domain to
various administrative agencies of the sovereign as well as
to public and private corporations, who, in turn, have the
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1: ". . . nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ."
See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 41 L.Ed. 399
(1896); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 41 L.Ed. 489
(1896); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41
L.Ed. 979 (1867).
30. 1 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 6, §1.3.
31. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
41 L.Ed. 979 (1867).
32. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 49 L.Ed. 169 (1904); Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 46 L.Ed. 679 (1902).
33. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877). See 2 STORY,
COMMENTARIES OP THE CONSTITUTION §1789 n. a (5th ed. 1891).
34. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Co., 262 U.S. 700, 67 L.Ed. 1186 (1923),
affirming 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 Pac. 27 (1921); United States v.
4,450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 167 (D.C. Minn. 1939); Bergen
County v. S. Goldberg & Co., 76 NJ. Super. 524, 185 A.2d 38 (1962).
35. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 258 U.S. 13, 66
L.Ed. 437 (1922); State v. McCook, 109 Conn. 621, 147 Atl. 126 (1929);
Town of Morgan v. Hutton & Bourbannais, 215 N.C. 531, 112 S.E.2d 111
(1960).
36. Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Whelan
v. Johnston, 192 Miss. 673, 6 So.2d 300 (1942); Riggs v. Springfield,
344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939); Bookhart v. Central Elec. Power
Co-op., 222 S.C. 289, 72 S.E.2d 576 (1952).
37. United States v. 9.94 Acres of Land, 51 F.Supp. 478 (E.D.S.C.
1943); Southern Ry. v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Va. 246, 105 S.E. 663 (1921).
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power to make determinations as to exercise of the power.38
Although this power can be delegated, its absolute character
precludes any surrender and any statutory attempt shall be
held invalid.39 The power of eminent domain has the same
longevity as the state itself.
The federal government did not assert this right in its own
name until the landmark case of Kohl v. United States in
1875.40 Since that time, the federal government has used its
own courts for appropriating property located in the District
of Columbia,41 the territories,42 and the states.48
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
To understand fully what eminent domain is, it is essential
to determine what it is not. Other government powers exist
which are also sovereign powers or grants of authority that
may be confused with eminent domain characteristics.
A. POLICE POWER
The basic distinguishing feature between the police power
and the power of eminent domain is in the method of reach-
ing their intended purpose. Police power regulates private
property to prevent its use in such a manner that is detri-
mental to the public. Eminent domain takes private property
because of a use needed by the public or on the public's be-
half. Both powers are oriented in the public's behalf as de-
termined by the legislature, but police power is basically
concerned with restraint and compulsion of the use of prop-
38. Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 67 L.Ed. 1167
(1922), affirming 44 R.I. 31, 114 Atl. 185 (1921); Riden v. Philadelphia,
B. & W. R.R., 182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943); Bronx Chamber of
Commerce v. Fullen, 174 Misc. 524, 21 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1940); Belton
v. Wateree Power Co., 123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E.2d 587 (1922).
39. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848);
Zn re Southern Blvd. R.R., 146 N.Y. 352, 40 N.E. 1000 (1895); City
of Milwaukee v. Schomberg, 261 Wis. 166, 52 N.W.2d 151 (1952);
Bradley v. City Council of Greenville, 212 S.C. 389, 46 S.E.2d 291 (1948).
40. 91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449 (1875). In 1871 the State of Michigan
was denied the power to condemn for the United States. People ex Tel.
Trombley v. Humprey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
41. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 37 L.Ed. 170 (1892);
United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 28 L.Ed. 846 (1884).
42. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 81 L.Ed. 1122
(1936); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.R., 135 U.S. 641, 34
L.Ed. 295 (1890), reversing 33 Fed. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1888).
48. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449 (1875).
[Vol. 15
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erty while the power of eminent domain terminates the use
of the property by its owner.44
Although examples of police powers can be given which
seem to protect economic interests, it is generally considered
to be a valid exercise of governmental authority on behalf of
health, morals, and safety in the name of the public welfare.
It can be well imagined how financially burdensome police
powers might become, but there is no obligation of compensa-
tion imposed on the sovereign.
Basically, then, the exercise of police power by the sov-
ereign impairs the owner's property rights because the free
exercise of these rights is detrimental to the public interest.
No compensation is required because such use is expected
to be followed in accordance with the public will. Such in-
jury will be recognized as damnum absque injuria,45 or that
the "injury" is a benefit as the property owner receives the
profit for which the regulation was intended.46
Although a proper exercise of the power does not require
compensation, there may be a taking in the constitutional
sense for which compensation will be required. This right
to compensation does not result because of a relinquishment
of ownership, but because of an impairment of the value of
the land or actual destruction of the property.47 If ever an
exercise of police power should become so regulative as to
effectively deprive a person of his property, the result would
be a legal limbo - both an invalid exercise of police power,
since it is unreasonable and goes beyond proper police power,48
and an invalid exercise of eminent domain, since no pro-
vision was made for compensation.
49
44. Chicago Ry. Co. v. Drainage Com'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 50 L.Ed.
596 (1906). See KUCERA, EMINENT DOMAIN VERsus PoLic POWER - A
COMMON MIscoNcEPKoN, Institute of Eminent Domain 1-36 (1959).
45. City of Clayton v. Nemours, 353 Mo. 61, 182 S.W.2d 57 (1944),
cert. den., 323 U.S. 684, 89 L.Ed. 554 (1944).
46. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885); Franco-
Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F.Supp. 408 (Ct. Cl. 1955);
Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d
814 (1958).
47. Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F.Supp. 682 (D.C. Md. 1961); House
v. Los Angeles Co. Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 P.2d 950
(1945); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727
(1960).
48. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 80 L.Ed. 575
(1935); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); Con-
gressional School of Areo v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146
A.2d 558 (1958).
49. Stengel v. Crandon, 156 Fla. 592, 23 So.2d 835 (1946); Arvern
Bay Constn. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
1963]
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Although it has been held that police power was reserved
to the states by the first ten amendments to the Constitution, 0
it is now accepted that the Federal Government may exercise
such reasonable police powers as it deems necessary, pro-
vided it is acting within the proper exercise of its powers
granted by the constitution in the jurisdictions which are
within its sphere of control.51 If at any time such exercise
exceeds reasonableness and becomes so arbitrary as to affect
a taking, compensation will be required.52
Police powers can be broad and inclusive, emulating as
much power in terms of control as any eminent domain pro-
ceedings.53 For example, building codes and zoning ordinances
can be tremendously restrictive and cause extreme financial
loss, but are, in fact, a valid exercise of police power requir-
ing no compensation. 54 Billboards have been prohibited in
the name of public safety,5 trade restricted in the name of
public health, 50 public service corporation rates fixed in the
name of public welfare,57 property forfeited and destroyed
when held illegally and against public interests,58 property,
50. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 24 L.Ed. 1115 (1878).
51. In the District of Columbia: District of Columbia v. Brooke,
214 U.S. 138, 53 L.Ed. 941 (1909). In public lands: Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1917). In
the territories: Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 42 L.Ed. 260
(1897).
52. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 37
L.Ed. 463 (1893).
53. As Justice Holmes said in a famous dissenting opinion: "The
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields
of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to ter-
minate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.
Property must not be taken without compensation, but with the help
of a phrase [i.e., police power] some property may be taken or destroyed
for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too much.
When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that
they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could
not go on." Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 72 L.Ed. 845, 852 (1928).
54. Armstrong v. Goyco, 29 F.2d 900 (1st cir. 1928); MacEwen v.
City of New Rochelle, 149 Misc. 251, 267 N.Y.S. 36 (1936); Richards
v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); Weber City
Sanitation Comm'n v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955).
55. In re Wilshire, 103 Fed. 620 (S.D. Cal. 1900); Gunning System v.
Buffalo, 62 App. Div. 497, 71 N.Y.S. 155 (1901).
56. Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 60 L.Ed. 396
(1916); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 59 L.Ed. 900 (1915).
57. Yunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1877).
58. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); Asso-
ciate Inv. Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 885 (1955); Police Commr's
v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 Atl. 455 (1901).
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such as cattle59 and trees,60 eradicated when diseased, and
even houses demolished if the condition endangers public
safety.61 All these measures are examples of valid implemen-
tation of police power without any need for compensation.
The resemblance between police power and eminent do-
main is essentially in the recognition of the superior right of
the public over the individual property owner. As a general
rule under police power, the property is not appropriated to
another use but is destroyed, the value impaired, or use re-
stricted, and no compensation is required, because its present
use is in defiance of existing statutes and ordinances. Emi-
nent domain exercises a superior right over the property by
taking it, and since such action or loss was not because of
its present use, compensation will be required.
B. TAXATION
Taxation is a sovereign power, which exacts a ratable por-
tion of the produce of individual citizens and labor for the
support of government in the administration of its laws,
and the means of continuing the functions of the state. 2
There is, however, a marked difference between the sovereign
powers of eminent domain and taxation. Both powers exact
a forced contribution from the individual on behalf of the
public, but the portion of the public affected differentiates
the powers.
Eminent domain operates upon the individual property
owner with no reference to the amount of value exacted from
any other segment of the community; taxation is specifically
directed toward a community or a class of persons in the
community by some basic rule of apportionment. 3 The simi-
larity terminates with the forced contribution aspect. The
forced contribution of taxation must be in relation to the rest
of the public, whereas, that of eminent domain is above and
beyond any apportioned share of governmental burden and
for a specific use, not a general use as in taxation. 64
59. Dunbar v. Augusta, 90 Ga. 830, 17 S.E. 907 (1892); New Orleans
v. Charonleau, 121 La. 890, 46 So. 911 (1908).
60. State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atl. 80 (1897).
61. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894).
62. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); New London
v. Miller, 60 Conn. 112, 22 AtI. 499 (1891).
63. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 26 L.Ed. 238 (1880).
64. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516
(1937); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45 (1941),
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Even with these basic distinguishing features, there has
been some controversy and confusion between eminent domain
and a particular species of taxation known as special assess-
ment or betterments.6 5 This form of taxation does have the
characteristic of being over and above the general ratable
share paid by the public.
Special assessment is an assessment for a part or the whole
cost of a local improvement upon property to be benefited by
the improvement. Acts by the legislature requiring such as-
sessment have been held constitutidnal ;66 even if the cost is
exceeded by the assessment, it will not be termed an invalid
exercise of authority if it is done by equitable methods.67 If
it can be shown, however, that the special assessment is in
excess of benefits conferred by the improvement, a different
result may occur.68 Taxes, assessment, and levy are fre-
quently used interchangeably69 though, properly speaking,
assessment does not include the levy of taxes.70 Assessment
implies taxes, but one of a particular kind, Taxes are levied
without reference to any one benefit; an assessment is levied
only on something specific which is the subject of the bene-
fit. It is the duty of the owners receiving these benefits to
repay the cost according to the measure or portion of benefit
received. 71
Even though the apportionment is reduced to only those
people receiving the benefits, it still retains this element
which separates it from eminent domain which adheres to
no degree of apportionment. Some states have in the past
felt that this attention to certain property in special assess-
ment was a form of eminent domain. 72 Illinois had to change
a tax provision of its constitution from one of uniform taxa-
tion to a provision that would allow a special assessment to
65. See Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 41 L.Ed. 369
(1896).
66. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Hazen et al., 116 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 179 Ga. 471, 176
S.E. 494 (1934).
67. Donaldson's Heirs v. City of New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118
So. 134 (1927).
68. See Barnes v. Dyer, 56 Vt. 469 (1884); ef., M ll's Mill v. Hawkins,
232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1958).
69. Huyler et al. v. Huyler's et al., 44 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1943).
70. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Patrick Cudaly Family Co.,
102 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1939).
71. In re Walker River Irrig. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921).
72. E.g., Philadelphia v. Penn. Hospital, 143 Pa. St. 367, 22 Atl. 744
(1891); State v. City Council, 12 Rich. 702 (S.C. 1860).
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come under the banner of taxation and not eminent domain. 3
Today, however, the distinction is recognized that taxation,
whether through general or special assessment, is the re-
spective apportioned contribution of the public burden of
governmental services; whereas, eminent domain causes the
individual to contribute to the public over and above his ap-
portioned contribution which demands compensation for the
loss of his property.
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS
One of the first considerations of any study of eminent
domain is to determine the inclusiveness of the word "prop-
erty" in a proceeding to acquire private property for public
use in its status as the res. By general definition the power
extends to all property within the sovereign's jurisdiction.
Therefore, it seems to logically follow that the sovereign's
authority extends over all private property in its respective
jurisdiction.74 Real property, then, is subject to the power
including all rights and interests such as easements,7" riparian
rights,7 6 buildings; 77 in short, all general real estate. Such a
definition will also include personal property, 78 intangibles
and incorporeal rights such as choses in action,7 9 patent
rights,80 franchises, 81 or any form of contract.
"Property," then, can be said to include every kind of
right or interest capable of being enjoyed and where it is
feasible to determine a monetary value on the property
73. Ill. Const. art. IX, §2.5 (1848) provided for equality and uniformity
as "indispensable to all taxation where general or local." See City of
Chicago v. Lamed, 34 Ill. 203, 276 (1864). The Const. of 1870 art. IX,
§2.5 eliminated any reference to restrictive provisions of uniformity in
all municipal taxation and provided the General Assembly with the
power of delegating special assessment, art. IX, §9. See White v. City
of Bloomington, 94 Ill. 604 (1880).
74. Bronx Chamber of Commerce v. Fullen, 174 Misc. 524, 21 N.Y.S.2d
474 (1940); Ellis v. Turnpike Conm'n, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d
719 (1954).
75. Beals v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 245 Mass. 20, 139 N.E. 492
(1923); Monogahela Power Co. v. Shackelford, 137 W.Va. 441, 73
S.E.2d 809 (1952).
76. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall 497, 19 L.Ed. 984 (1870); Bino v.
City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956).
77. In re Housing Authority of City of Charlotte, 223 N.C. 649, 65
S.E.2d 761 (1951).
78. Daily v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 699 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Illinois
Cities Water Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 11 Ill. 547, 144 N.E.2d 729 (1957).
79. Cincinnati v. Louisville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 56 L.Ed. 481 (1912).
80. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 26 L.Ed. 786 (1882).
81. Greenwood v. Union Freight R.R., 105 U.S. 13, 26 L.Ed. 961
(1882); Brady v. Atlantic City, 53 N.J.Eq. 440, 32 Atl. 271 (1895).
1963]
13
Boynton: Components of Eminent Domain: An Ancient Tool for Contemporary Us
Published by Scholar Commons, 1963
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taken.8 2 Money itself, however, does not seem to be subject
to the power of eminent domain for the states; at best it
would seem to be only a forced loan even though the need may
well be a public one. 3 The federal government, however,
possesses the power of eminent domain over money, this pow-
er having been expressly or impliedly derived from the Consti-
tution.84 It has been held that since the Federal government
has the control of the finance and currency, it has the power
to take gold certificates by eminent domain proceedings8 5
Rights that cannot be appropriated under eminent domain,
would necessarily be those which have no measurable mone-
tary value; the right to vote would be such an exemption. In
an Ohio case it was held that where a statute required the
consent of abutting property owners before a railway could
be constructed on a street, a railway company authorized to
exercise eminent domain could not condemn the consent of
objecting abutting property owners.80
Personal services needed by the sovereign in behalf of the
administration of justice or for the defense of the nation
have been compared to a form of eminent domain over the
person instead of property. Although it is necessary to pro-
vide compensation for the services, the amount given is more
a matter of policy than a constitutional obligations 7
The compensation that is provided here is upon a different
principle than the payment provided under eminent domain:
people compelled to serve are usually paid all alike, regard-
less of their time or services.88 Contrary positions have
82. United States v. 44 Acres of land in Berkeley County, 121 F.Supp.
862 (E.D.S.C. 1954) Rhyne v. Town of Mt. Holly, 251 N.C. 521, 112
S.E.2d 40 (1960); State ex reL Bruestte v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 1, 110
N.E.2d 778 (1953). For cases holding that the payment must be in
money see Schwartz v. City of New London, 20 Conn. Supp. 21, 120
A.2d 84 (1955); Hellen v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N.E. 1070 (1905);
Railroad Co. v. Halstead, 7 W.Va. 301 (1874).,
83. Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345 (1865).
84. Discussed in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449
(1875). See United States v. Champbell, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1933);
82 PA.L.REv. 395 (1934).
85. Ibid.; see also Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 79 L.Ed.
907 (1934).
86. Hamilton, etc. Tracton Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N.E.
1011 (1902).
87. Witnesses to attend court and testify without fees: Ex parte
Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W.
352 (1897).
88. An expert was compelled to attend court and answer hypothetical
questions upon the same fee as given witnesses: Dixon v. People, 168
Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897).
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been taken,8 9 but the important factor differentiating the
two types of powers is the feature of uniformity; if there
were a statute applying a uniform price for property, re-
gardless of individual value, it would doubtlessly be found
unconstitutional.90
All property subject to individual ownership is within the
purview of eminent domain powers within the jurisdictions
of the sovereign or to whom the sovereign has delegated the
authority.91 By the same token, public property is also
subject to eminent domain by the sovereign itself.92 there is
some question, obviously, whether or not a condemnor who
has been delegated the power can exercise eminent domain
over public land.93
Since this power over all property is essential to the public
welfare, it will continue without any impairment or extreme
modification,94 and, as far as the property itself is concerned,
there can be nothing in the title that will exempt the prop-
erty from being subject to eminent domain. It is a power
that lies dormant until legislative action determines its exer-
cise over that property.95
89. United States v. Howe, 26 Fed. Cas. 394 (No. 15404a) (W.D.
Ark. 1881).
90. Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water & Sewer Dist., 237 S.C. 144,
116 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1960).
91. E.g., Fed. Govt.: Brooks v. United States, 119 F.2d 636 (9th Cir.
1941); cert. den., 313 U.S. 594, 85 L.Ed. 1548 (1941); State: Gourdine's
Ex'rs v. Davis, 1 Bailey 469 (S.C. 1830); Municipality: Paris Mountain
Water Co. v. City of Greenville, 105 S.C. 180, 89 S.E. 669 (1916).
92. United States v. 929.70 acres of land, 205 F.Supp. 456 (C.D.S.D.
1962); Elberton Southern R. v. State H'wy Dept., 211 Ga. 838, 89
S.E.2d 645 (1955); Riley v. S.C. H'wy Dept., 238 S.C. 19, 118 S.E.2d
809 (1961).
93. United States v. Southern Power Co., 31 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1929);
Board of Comm'rs v. Holliday, 182 S.C. 510, 189 S.E. 885 (1937);
Twin City Power Co. v. Savannah River Elec. Co., 163 S.C. 438, 161
S.E. 750 (1930).
94. State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 264 U.S. 472, 68
L.Ed. 796 (1923); Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90
N.H. 472, 11 A.2d 569 (1940); Bradley v. City Council of Greenville,
212 S.C. 389, 46 S.E.2d 291 (1948); But see Bailey v. Housing Authority
of Bainbridge, 217 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959) and Allen v. City
Council of Augusta, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d (1960). A constitutional
amendment may constitute a voluntary surrender within specified limi-
tations.
95. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Co., 262 U.S. 700, 67 L.Ed. 1186
(1923), affirming 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 Pac. 27 (1921); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R., 258 U.S. 13, 66 L.Ed. 437 (1922);
Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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THE TAKING UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
The "taking" of property by eminent domain proceedings
has been said to be the basic reason for the Bill of Rights
and similar provisions in state constitutions which prohibit
the acquisition of private property for private re-use.9 6 These
constitutional provisions have been interpreted broadly and
it has been held that property can be taken without the formal
devesting of title from the owner.97 Generally, any limitation
which causes ". . . any destruction, restriction or interrup-
tion of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the
property of a person for a public purpose constitutes a tak-
ing thereof"98 and, consequently, will necessitate compen-
sation.
As compensation must be paid to the owner for the taking
of property that is capable of having a monetary value,99 a
"taking" in land would be where an actual invasion impaired
or partially destroyed the land even though not taken in
fact. Courts will consider such an invasion sufficient to re-
quire compensation, as this is, in essence, eminent domain. 00
Because a monetary value must be ascertainable, neither a
business nor its profits can be acquired by eminent domain
since they are speculative and depend on variances aside
from the use to which the land may be put. 10 '
The strict interpretation of a "taking" is the actual physical
invasion and appropriation of the property, 0 2 or a permanent
ouster of the owner. 03 The prevailing view, however, holds
that any substantial interference with an individual's prop-
erty which destroys, decreases the market value, or impairs
96. 2 NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMA1N §6.1(1) (3d ed.
Sackrnan & VanBrunt (1950).
97. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1916); United
States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Pennsylvania R.
v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 Atl. 386 (1924), cert. den., 267
U.S. 592 69 L.Ed. 803 (1924).
98. Gorricon v. Clackamus County, 141 Or. 564, 18 P.2d 814, 817
(1933).
99. United States v. 44 acres of land in Berkeley County, 121 F.Supp.
862 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Rhyne v. Town of Mt. Holly, 251 N.C. 521, 112
S.E.2d 40 (1960); State ex rel. Bruestte v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 1, 110
N.E.2d 778 (1953).
100. Boynton v. State of N.Y., 28 Misc.2d 12, 215 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1961).
101. ibad See also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 78,
U.S. 300 73 L.Ed. 390 (1928).
102. Rew York Tel. Co. v. United States, 136 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1943);
Horn v. Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642 (1949).
103. 11,000 acres of land v. United States, 152 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945),
cert. den., 328 U.S. 835, 90 L.Ed. 1611 (1945).
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the free use and enjoyment of such property to a marked
degree will be a taking within the constitutional expression,
even though the title or possession of the property remains
undisturbed.
0 4
Damage to property in the construction of public improve-
ments has had a rather callous history from the viewpoint
of the property owner. 05 Courts have held that if the sov-
ereign inflicts injury on private property through a valid
exercise of eminent domain there will be no liability for
compensation unless the injury was such as to deprive the
owner of the use and possession of his land or there was
want of reasonable care or skill. 0 6 This reasoning leaves
a large void, and is simply property damage without compen-
sation. It is interesting to note that the same courts would
award compensation to property owners if such damages
were caused by private corporations regardless of skill or
care, providing that such damages were actionable at common
law. 07
Not until 1870 was any remedial action taken by a state
to amend its constitution to protect property owners from
such damages. Illinois amended its constitution to include
the words "or damaged" to the phrase "property taken.' 08
Other states followed suit and provided that private property
should not be taken or damaged for public use without com-
pensation. 09
The next step, of course, was to define the "damage" clause
to determine when compensation was due. The Supreme
Court of Illinois, being the first state to judicially consider
the question, 01 propounded a definition which has been fol-
lowed by the majority of the states that requires such com-
104. North Counties H-E Co. v. United States, 70 F.Supp. 900 (Ct.C1.
1947), Eller v. Bd. of Ed. of Buncombe Co., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144
(1955); Gasque v. Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 81 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
105. See 2 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 89, §§6.38-6.45; Lenhoff, De-
veloopment of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 CoL.L.REv. 596 (1942);
106. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L.Ed. 336 (1878);
DeBaker v. Southern Cal. Ry., 106 Cal. 257, 39 Pac. 610 (1895); In re
Grade Crossing Comm'rs. of Buffalo, 210 N.Y. 32, 94 N.E. 188 (1911);
City of Columbia v. Melton, 85 S.C. 558, 67 S.E. 902 (1910).
107. Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S.
317, 27 L.Ed. 739 (1883); Cogswell v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 103 N.Y.
10 (1886).
108. Ill. Const. art. II, §13 (1870).
109. NicHoLs, op. cit. supra note 89, §6.44 contains a list of states
btying such provisions.
110. Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
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pensation for damaged land.'11 This interpretation maintains
that compensation is required when the property injury
would be actionable at common law and when some actual
interference occurs where special damage results over and
above the damage sustained by the general public." 2 It is
apparent that the multitude of types of damage necessitates
that each case be determined on its own merits and particular
facts, but it is universally agreed that the damage need not
be limited to actual or direct physical injury.1 3
Today, then, the modern view protects the property owner
from a loss by damage to property as well as by the taking
of property when eminent domain powers are invoked. This
has not in any way restricted the use of eminent domain, but
it does permit a more equitable exercise of that power.
COMPENSATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
A private property owner's right to compensation for prop-
erty lost through eminent domain proceedings is a universally
accepted constitutional guarantee as a natural by-product
of our democratic way of life.1 4 This right has been defined
as "self executing," needing no legislative assistance for its
enforcement."35 The obligation of compensation to be paid
by the state is, however, provided for in some manner in
every state constitution except North Carolina."16 The Consti-
tution of the United States provides for it through the fifth"
17
111. E.g., Montgomery v. Townsend, 80 Ala. 489, 2 So. 155 (1887);
Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896); Van DeVere v. Kansas
City, 107 Mo. 83, 17 S.W. 695 (1891); Twenty-second Corp. v. Oregon
R.R., 36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); of., Owens v. S.C. H'wy Dept.,
239 S.C. 44, 121 S.E.2d 240 (1961), S.C. Constitution recognizes no
distinction between "taking" and "damaging."
112. Ibid. See also, Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 166, 31 'L.Ed. 630
(1887); of., Louisville v. Hekemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S.W. 165 (1914)
(city dump facilities); Oklahoma City v. Vetter, 72 Okl. 196, 179 Pac.
473 (1919) (hospital for contagious diseases); Lambert v. Norfolk,
108 Va. 259, 61 S.E. 776 (1908) (cemetery).
113. Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489 (1896); Cook v. Salt
Lake City, 48 Utah 58, 157 Pac. 643 (1916); Rice Hope Plantation
v. S.C. Pub. Ser. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
114. E.g., Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 71 L.Ed. 1083 (1926);
County of Mohave v. Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 P.2d 128 (1955);
Redevelopment Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 114
S.E.2d 688 (1960); Parrish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79 S.E. 635
(1913).
115. Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water & Sewer Dist., 237 S.C. 144,
116 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1960).
116. 1 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN §1.3 (3d ed. Sackman
& VanBrunt 1950).
117. Cincinnati v. Louisville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 56 L.Ed. 481 (1911).
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and fourteenth11 8 amendments. Further, this right is abso-
lute, permitting no qualifications or conditions by the con-
demnor.
119
Although it would seem obvious at first impression, it has
been questioned whether or not the compensation awarded
to the property owner must be in the medium of money.
Such compensation as the right to use the improvement
120
or the substitution of other lands121 has been held to be in-
adequate as compensation required. All courts who have con-
sidered the question agree that the compensation awarded
must be in money, 22 and three state constitutions so pro-
vide.'
23
The troublesome point confronting the courts was the de-
termination of what was proper compensation in terms of
value. States have used such obviously flexible terms for
guideposts as "just," "reasonable," or "adequate."'' 24 In an
effort to establish plausible standards, different criteria has
been submitted to cover the position of all parties, such as
market value, value to the owner, and value to the buyer.
125
Another trio of standards offered is cost (or physical value
of land and improvements), income (or economic relationship
of the return that the property will probably earn to the
price for which it will sell), and market value (or comparison
of the property in question with recently sold property).126
118. Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 193 U.S. 189, 48 L.Ed.
675 (1903), General Box Co. v. United States, 107 F.Supp. 981 (W.D.La.
1952).
119. Rosenbaum v. State Road Dept., 129 Fla. 723, 177 So. 220 (1937);
Craig v. Dallas, 20 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1929). But see Laycock v. United
States, 230 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1956). "Moreover, even if the principle
of just compensation is involved, it still must be established that the
United States has consented to be sued for the recovery of such com-
pensation. The United States may withhold, withdraw, or condition
that consent anyway it chooses." 230 F.2d at 850.
120. State v. King County Court, 77 Wash. 593, 138 Pac. 277 (1914).
121. Horn's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 1 L.Ed. 391 (1795);
Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pac. 1040 (1905); Groce v. Green-
ville Ry., 94 S.C. 199, 78 S.E. 888 (1913).
122. E.g., Schwartz v. City of New London, 20 Conn. Supp. 21, 120
A.2d 84 (1955); Hellen v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N.E. 1070 (1905);
Matter of New York R., 28 Hun. 426 (N.Y. 1882); Railroad Co. v.
Halstead, 7 W.Va. 301 (1874).
123. Ark. Const. art. XII, (1874) §9; Kan. Const. art. XII, (1859)
§4; Vt. Const. art. I, (1793) §2.
124. E.g., Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 40 L.Ed. 188 (1895); Des
Moines W.W. Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486
(1924); Virginia R.R. v. Henery, 8 Nev. 165 (1813).
125. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN §12 (2d ed. 1953).
126. ALLISON, THREE APPROACHES TO VALUE ON EMINENT DOMAIN,
Institute of Eminent Domain (1961).
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The ultimate goal is, of course, to establish a standard that
will permit a fair return to the property owner considering
all circumstances involving his property. Even though the
term "market value" has inherent ambiguities which depend
on the interpretation by the person employing the term (e.g.,
an economist or a realtor), and when the sale took place (e.g.,
in a boom or a depression), most courts have used this term
as the best bases available to determine compensation.
12 T7
It has been held, however, that the proposed use of the land
which might enhance its value to the taker will not have
a major significance in establishing the market value.128
It is important to note that compensation will not be limited
just to the land taken regardless of the effect on the re-
maining land retained by the owner. Consequently, if the
remaining land is diversely affected due to the appropriation
of property for public use, "just compensation to which the
owner is entitled includes the damages to the remainder of
the tract resulting from the taking as well as the value of
the land taken."'.
29
Accordingly, the benefits the remaining land receives from
the public use or improvement will also be considered when
determining compensation awards. The theory of set-off was
-Iecognized as early as 1807 when a Massachusetts court de-
clared in an eminent domain proceeding involving a road:
The owner may suffer much greater damage [than just
the value of the land taken] by the road depriving him
of water or otherwise rendering the cultivation of his
farm inconvenient and laborious; or it may happen that
the new highway may essentially benefit his farm and
127. E.g., Reed v. Ohio Ry., 126 Ill. 48, 17 N.E. 807 (1888) "The
present market value of the land taken furnishes the true bases for
determining the compensation to be paid the land owner for the land
taken and appropriated to public use." 17 N.E. at 809; Matter of Sixth
Ave. Elevated RR. 265 App. Div. 200, 38 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1942) ..,
just compensation being required, the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken is essential . . . the usual method of fixing such com-
pensation is by ascertaining market value." 38 N-Y.S.2d at 737; Georgia
Power Co. v. Mays, 187 Ga. 120, 72 S. E. 900 (1911) ". . . the nature
and character of the property, its situation, its availability for different
uses, and all the facts . . .may be taken into consideration, and from
all of them the jury may arrive at what is the fair market value .... 
at 72 S.E. 902; see also, 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DomAIn
§§17-36 (2d ed, 195S),
128. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 100 L.Ed. 240
(1955) -see Comment, 9 VAN.L.REv. 565 (1956).
129. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,42 L.Ed. 270 (1896).
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that he may suffer very little or no injury by the loca-
tion. The estimation [of compensation] ought, therefore,
to be according to the damage which the owner will,
in fact, sustain in his property by the opening of his
road. 1
30
The benefits received by the remaining land, however, must
be related to its market value and not strictly to the neces-
sities of the owner,131 must arise from the creation of the
improvement,13 2 and should affect the particular parcel or
tract of land from which the taking was made.13 3 Thus bene-
fits to separate independent parcels of land belonging to the
property owner from whose land property was taken will
not be considered in determining the effect on the market
value.
13 4
The concept of benefits being deducted from the compen-
sation award would seem to support the basic philosophy of
eminent domain; the power is employed for the benefit of
the public, and the land taken, therefore, must be considered
in the total scheme rather than as an isolated taking. The
Supreme Court of the United States has supported this ra-
tionale, holding that the right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment is that the owner will not be deprived of the
market alaue of his propertyis4a Accordingly, this rule
carried to its logical conclusion would permit no compen-
sation when the owner receives in effect no damage
because of the taking.13 5 Discussion of fairness developed
in the courts concerning a situation where a property owner
whose land was taken and benefits deducted from his com-
pensation as opposed to the property owners whose prop-
erty was not taken and received the same benefits also
developed in the courts. Courts have split on this ques-
130. Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2. Mass. 489 (1807). Accord, Mangles
v. Hudson County Freeholders, 55 N.J.L. 88, 25 Atl. 322 (1892); Green-
ville R.R. v. Parlow, 5 Rich. 428 (S.C. 1852); Long v. Shirley, 177
Va. 401, 14 SE.2d 375 (1941).
131. Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Divit, 182 N.E.2d 749
(Ill. 1962); Hamilton v. Pitt., etc., 190 Pa. 51, 42 Atl. 369 (1899).
132. Dickinson v. Brown-Crnnmer Inv. Corp., 137 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1943); People v. McReynolds, 31 Cal. App.2d 219, 87 P.2d 734
(1939); Hoyt v. Stamford, 116 Conn. 402, 165 Atl. 357 (1933).
133. Knoxville v. Barton, 128, Tenn. 177, 159 S.W. 837 (1913).
134. Chicago v. Spoor, 190 II. 340, 60 N.E. 540 (1901).
134a. McCoy v. Union El. R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 62 L.Ed. 1156 (1917);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,42 L.Ed. 270 (1896).
135. Pittsburgh, etc., R. v. Wolcott, 162 Ind. 399, 69 N.E. 451 (1904);
Tobie v. Brown County Comm'rs, 20 Kan. 14 (1878).
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tion,130 but the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that benefits may be constitutionally set off only when
they are special benefits to the property owner as opposed to
general benefits.
137
A diversity of opinion has developed in the courts regarding
set off procedures for benefits.138 South Carolina in earlier
decisions held that all benefits could be set off from the
compensation to be paid a property owner for the loss of
his land.' 39 A subsequent constitutional provision, however,
provided that when private property was taken by corpora-
tions who had been delegated the power of eminent domain,
compensation must be made "irrespective of any benefits
from any improvements proposed by such corporation."'
' 40
The word "corporations" excludes municipal corporations
who are permitted to set off all benefits from the damages
to the remaining land.'
4 '
Stated broadly, an individual property owner who loses his
property through eminent domain procedures will derive con-
stitutional protection for full and complete compensation
for the actual loss considering the benefits accrued to his
remaining land by the improvements as well as the damage.
The "loss" is to be interpreted as compensation for the taking
of the land and not just for the land taken. Even though
the legislature may determine the criteria for ascertaining
the compensation to be awarded the property owner,
42
136. Cf., Washa v. Prairie County, 186 Ark. 530, 54 S.W.2d 686
(1932); State H'wy Board v. Bridges, 60 Ga. App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907
1939); Yancey v. State H'wy & Public Works Comm., 218 N.C. 438,
11 S.E.2d 314 (1940); Nowaczyk v. Marathon County, 205 Wis. 536, 238
N.W. 383 (1931). See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
§7 (2d ed. 1953).
137. Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547, 55 L.Ed. 848 (1911).
138. Cf., Washa v. Prairie County, 186 Ark. 530, 54 S.W.2d 686
(1932); State H'wy Board v. Bridges, 60 Ga.App. 240, 3 S.E.2d 907
(1939); Yancey v. State H'wy & Public Works Comm., 218 N.C. 438,
11 S.E.2d 314 (1940); Nowaczyk v. Marathon County, 205 Wis. 536,
238 N.W. 383 (1930). See ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
§7 (2d ed. 1953).
139. Greenville Ry. v. Parlow, 5 Rich. 428 (S.C. 1852); Charleston Ry.
v. Blake, 12 Rich. 634 (S.C. 1860).
140. S.C. Const. art. IX, §20 (1895); see Bowen v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 17 S.C. 574 (1882); Charleston Ry. v. Leech, 33 S.C. 179, 11 S.E.
631 (1890).
141. See Bramlett v. Greenville, 83 S.C. 110, 70 S.E. 450 (1911);
Bailey v. Clinton, 88 S.C. 118, 70 S.E. 446 (1911).
142. United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.
Supp. 811 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); Pickens County v. Jordon, 239 Ala. 589, 196
So. 121 (1940); In re Appropriation of Easements for H'wy Purposes,
172 Ohio St. 524, 178 N.E.2d 787 (1961).
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the ultimate power to settle eminent domain compensation
questions resides with the judiciary. 143
PUBLIC USE UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
"No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon
which there is greater variety and conflict of reasoning and
result than that presented as to the meaning of the words
'public use' .... ",144 This often quoted expression of apparent
frustration aptly describes the judicial maze through which
eminent domain has trod since its inception as a sovereign
power. Although it is universally agreed that private prop-
erty cannot constitutionally be taken for public use by the
sovereign or by those to whom the sovereign has delegated
authority unless compensation is given, there has never been
any universal agreement on a definition of public use; it
would actually seem incapable of a precise definition that
would be judicially useful.
145
It is interesting to note that the common ground of agree-
ment, i.e., that no private property can be taken for private
re-use, was not expressly forbidden by any of the earlier
constitutions. 46 It is settled beyond question, however, that
the prohibition against such a taking is implied in the con-
stitutional meaning.14
7
Although a common ground has never been reached in the
quest for a succinct definition of public use, two lines of
judicial opinions have been demarcated. The dichotomy
chiefly centers around the definition of "use" itself.
"Use," employed in a "public use" context is susceptible to
two definitions: (1) employment, application, or service;
(2) benefit, advantage or utility.14 Those courts which
143. Mononghela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 37
L.Ed. 463 (1893); Beals v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 381, 144 P.2d 839
(1944); City of Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S.C. 357, 40 S.E.2d 239 (1946).
144. Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400-1 (1876).
145. See City of Melo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal.App.2d 261, 311 P.2d
135 (1957); Fountain Park Co., 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927);
Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956); State
ex reL. Chelan Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct., 142 Wash. 270, 253 Pac. 115
(1927).
146. See 2 NicHoLs, LAW OF EMINENT DOAIN op. cit. supra note 109,
§7.1.
147. See Connecticut College v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 AtI. 633
(1913); Young v. Wiggens, 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360 (1962); In re
Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. 27; 20 Atl. 109 (1890).
148. WEBSTER, NEW CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1958).
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once supported the former interpretation held to a narrow
scope of eminent domain application. Thus, in order to con-
stitute a "public use," it was mandatory that the public in
some manner actually use (or have the right to use) the
property appropriated; "public use," then, meant "use by
the public.1149 Although this definition implies use by the
public at large, courts did allow this conception of public
use to be applicable to inhabitants of a small or a restricted
area, provided that the use be in common as opposed to use
by private individuals.5 0
Obviously, this refined definition, calling for use by the
public, could raise some immediate problems in specific fact
situations; the necessary degree of use by the public,151 the
public service corporations who charge for services,152 and
the privately owned but truly public facilities 53 are a few
examples that seem to shroud the definition "use by the pub-
lic" in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Through the com-
plexities of various factual situations this definition became
weakened by the practicalities of application. 54
Courts, by necessity rather than by academic judicial rea-
soning, began to apply a broader interpretation to the defini-
tion of public use. It would seem to be logical that when
the necessities of the public became more acute in the grow-
ing industrial society of the twentieth century, the sovereign
power of eminent domain was the obvious tool to employ
within the constitutional limitations. Consequently, it was
recognized that the term "public use" must be changeable
149. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848);
In re Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 624 (1912); Re New York, 135
N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892); Pennsylvania M. L. I. Co. v. Philadelphia,
242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904 (1913); Nichols v. Central Va. P. Co., 143 Va.
405, 130 S.E. 764 (1926); Hench v. Pritt, 62 W.Va. 270, 57 S.E. 808(1907).150. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Chicago & L. Ry., 175 Ind. 304, 94 N.E.
326 (1911); Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 104 S.W.
762 (1907); Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249, 29
N.E. 246 (1891).
151. E.g., Bradley v. Fallbrook Irrg. Dist., 68 Fed. 948 (S.D. Cal. 1895);
of., Young v. Dugger, 23 N.M. 613, 170 Pac. 61 (1918) (irrigation of
land).
152. E.g., Stanley v. Jat St. Connecting R.R., 100 Misc. 493, 166
N.Y.S. 119 (1917); cf., Collier v. Union R.R., 113 Tenn. 96, 83 S.W.
155 (1904) (railroad spur tracks).
153. E.g., Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876);
Witcher v. Holland Waterworks Co., 66 Hun. 619, 20 N.Y.S. 560 (1892).
154. See NIcHOLS, THE MEANING OF PUBLIC USE IN THE LAW OF
PUBLIc DOMAIN, 20 B.U.L.REV. 615 (1940).
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as the needs of the public change, 155 permitting the sovereign
power of eminent domain to be constant in sovereign exercise,
but not static in application.
This philosophy allowed the judicial definition of public
use to expand to meet the needs of the public; it thus became
defined as public advantage or benefit, thereby employing
the alternate definition of use. Such definition permitted
total employment of community development if and wlhen
the sovereign determined that the use was public, the ju-
diciary having the final review of such authorization. 156
fllustrative of the change in what was considered a need
for the public are the housing and slum clearance cases. To
provide low cost housing and eliminate slums, Congress in
1937 enacted a housing statute which granted assistance to
states that would participate in the program.
57
To administer such a program, eminent domain powers
were obviously necessary. The question confronting the
courts in terms of public use was: Can private property be
condemned under eminent domain and its re-use be definitely
restricted to a small portion of the public? If the test were
to be strictly limited to "use by the public" in its strictest
application, the question would necessitate a broadening at
best. As early as 1936, however, New York State held that
such takings were constitutional as "the essential purpose
of the legislation is not to benefit that class or any class [i.e.,
persons with income under $2,500 per year]; it is to protect
and safeguard the entire public from the menace of slums."'158
The dual goals justifying public use, then, was the elimina-
tion of slums and the establishment of low cost public hous-
ing. Other courts followed this decision, reasoning that the
removal of slums and the establishment of a facility whereby
a reasonable segment of the public could participate would
155. E.g., Collier v. Union Station R.R., 113 Tenn. 96, 83 S.W. 155
(1904), "The term 'public use' is a flexible one. It varies and expands
with the growing needs of a more complex order." 83 S.W. at 162;
Tanner Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464
(1906), "The definition of 'public use' must be such as to give it a
degree of elasticity capable of meeting new conditions and improvements
and needs of society." 83 Pac. at 465.
156. Mononghela Navigation v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 37 L.Ed.
463 (1893); Beals v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 381, 144 P.2d 839 (1944).
157. 50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1940).
158. New York Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d
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justify the eminent domain powers.159 It must be noted that
at this juncture the program called for both the elimination
of slums and the establishment of low cost housing when
redeveloped. In other words, the slum problem was an equally
important reason for the passage of the Federal act.
When housing requirements became fairly fulfilled (al-
though this is a continuing program), slum clearance still
maintained its importance. Consequently, it was held that
the taking itself was sufficient to constitute the public use
and the disposition of the property was incidental to the
public use not requiring any subsequent rehousing1 60 Con-
gress encouraged programs which permitted the property
to be disposed of into private hands and allowed the property
to become productive. Through the Federal Housing Act
of 1949,161 capital grants and loans were provided for local
housing authorities. These funds were used to clear and
prepare land for re-use. With the primary goal of slum clear-
ance and low cost housing, the programs could include com-
mercial and industrial development.0 2 The individual state
statutes comprise the urban development laws for these pro-
grams.
163
The significant point in these decisions, over and above
the public use concept, was the disposal of the property. Since
the use was satisfied with the taking of the land, the ultimate
disposition into private hands did not invalidate the taking.
The courts which followed this reasoning'0 4 eliminated one
of the necessary evils of eminent domain: the collection of
land by the sovereign. Without such a concept the sovereign
would be limited to take land only when it could be used
by the public, in fact, even though the taking might constitute
159. E.g., Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673,
199 S.E. 43 (1938); McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938).
160. E.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104
A.2d 365 (1954); Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 139 A.2d
476 (Del. 1958); City Housing Authority v. Berkson, 415 Ill. 159, 112
N.E.2d 620 (1953).
161. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1952).
162. See URBAN RENEWAL: PROBLEM o ELIMINATION AND PREVENTION
oF URBAN DETERIORATION 72 HAR.L.REV. 504 (1959); SYmPosIUm-URBAN
RuNEWAL, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 1, 2, Vols. XXV-4, XXVI-1
(Duke U.S. of Law 1960-61).
163. Ibid.
164. E.g., Herzinger v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 203 Md. 49,
98 A.2d 87 (1953); Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451,
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a public use. By employing such rationalization that the
taking satisfies the use requirements, land can be permitted
to become productive and serve the public advantage in the
truest sense. If this were not the case, the sovereign could
well destroy productivity either by allowing harmful effects
of land to continue to exist because of the disposition problem
(e.g., slums) or by accumulating a vast inventory of land
and exempting it from productive use. Either choice is
against the public interest, individual rights notwithstanding.
The first state to pass a redevelopment law permitting
private re-use was New York in 1942; it was subsequently
held constitutional the following year. 16 5 Today twenty-eight
state courts of last resort have upheld the constitutionality of
slum clearance and urban redevelopment enabling legislation,
and forty-five states have enabling legislation or specific
constitutional provisions (or both) authorizing public agen-
cies to undertake slum clearance and urban redevelopment
projects.
1 66
In 1954 another major expansion of public use was promul-
gated by the United States Supreme Court. In Berman v.
Parker 67 the court permitted the power of eminent domain
to be employed for the removal of "blighted" areas which
were capable of rehabilitation; the disposition of the land
was to private redevelopment. In modifying the District
Court's position"6 that eminent domain should be used only
for the elimination of conditions injurious to the public
health, safety and morals, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
. . . We think the standards prescribed [by the act 16 9]
were adequate for executing the plan to eliminate not
only slums as narrowly defined by the District Court
but also the blighted areas that produce slums. 70
Carrying the concept to its obvious conclusion in support
of public use as public advantage, Mr. Douglas said: " . .
165. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §3301 (McKinney 1942); Murray v. La
Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. den., 321 U.S. 771,
88 L.Ed. 1066 (1944).
166. For a list of citations to statutes, constitutional provisions, and
court decisions, see U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, State
Enabling Legislation, Urban Redevelopment and Urban Renewal (June
1962).
167. 348 U.S. 26, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
168. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953).
169. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, 60 Stat. 790, D.C. Code
§5-701-5-719 (1951).
170. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 99 L.Ed. 27, 39 (1954).
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[i]f those who govern the District of Columbia decide the
nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there
is nothing in the Constitution... that stands in the way."' 7'
The Florida courts also became entangled in the blight
versus slum situation. In 1952, two years prior to the Berman
decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that land could
not be taken for urban redevelopment if the property was
to be disposed of by private redevelopment 72 In 1959, five
years after the Berman decision, the court held that the
clearance and redevelopment of slum areas as distinguished
from blighted areas is public use justifying a taking under
eminent domain, and the subsequent disposition of the prop-
erty is incidental. 78 This "distinguishing" feature permitted
the court to completely reverse itself. At any rate, the avail-
ability of re-use for private individuals is provided in Florida
by the public use, qualification being satisfied in the taking
for the eradication of slums.
Of the five states that do not have enabling legislation or
specific constitutional provisions authorizing agencies to un-
dertake slum clearance or urban redevelopment projects, three
are western states: Wyoming, Utah and Idaho. Their com-
bined population is less than many major metropolitan areas
in the country 7 4 which would necessarily decrease any need
for this type of eminent domain activity. The lack of such
enabling legislation in these three states does not necessarily
connote opposition to the broad judicial interpretation of
public use but amplifies the reasoning that the expanded use
of the term is based on the social order in terms of need.
The remaining two states without specific enabling legis-
lation or constitutional provisions are Louisiana and South
Carolina. Louisiana in 1954 repealed 75 certain sections of
their Housing Authority Law 7 6 which provided no enabling
legislation for slum clearance and urban redevelopment in
that state. In 1938, however, it was held that acquisition of
171. Ibid. at 38.
172. Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663
(Fla. 1952).
173. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency of City of Tampa, 115 So.2d
745 (Fla. 1959); see Comment, 34 TuL.L.REv. 616 (1960).
174. Idaho: 667,191; Wyoming: 330,066; Utah: 890,627; Combined: 1,-
590,884 U S. Dept. of Commerce, County and City Data Book, p.2 (1962).
175. La. Laws 1954, Acts 709, 711.
176. La. Rev. Stat. §§40:381-40:572.
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private property by a Housing Authority was for a public
use or purpose within the meaning of the constitution.
1 77
South Carolina has upheld the acquisition of private prop-
erty for the elimination of slums and the establishment of
a low-rent housing project as "an exercise of a proper gov-
ernmental function for a valid public purpose."'178 The Court,
in commenting on slum elimination said: ".... the conclusion
is inescapable that bad housing conditions have an adverse
effect on the health and morals of the city . .. , therefore,
the elimination of these slum areas is a proper function of
government, both city and state."' 79 This reasoning would
seem to pave the way for a subsequent decision holding that
the public use can be satisfied in the taking similar to de-
cisions in other jurisdictions. 80
In a case in 1956, Edens v. City of Columbia, the South
Carolina Supreme Court completely rejected this reasoning,
holding that the taking of private property for the elimination
of a slum to be disposed of by private redevelopment was
not a public use and, consequently, would be unconstitu-
tional.
81
The court followed a definition of public use offered in
a 1904 South Carolina case' 82 which equated "public use" to
a "use by the public" allowing that "the public must have a
definite and fixed use of the property to be condemned.
"183
In commenting on the previous South Carolina decision
upholding slum clearance and low-cost housing in other juris-
dictions, the court said:
Some of the decisions of other courts immediately in
point are contrary to our view, which are not distin-
177. Porterie v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182
So. 725 (1938). For definitions of "public use" see Anglle v. State,
212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948); Miller v. Police Jury of Washington
Parish, 266 La. 8, 74 So.2d 394 (1954).
178. McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425, 430 (1938).
179. Ibid. at 431-32.
180. E.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104
A.2d 365 (1954); Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 139 A.2d
476 (Del. 1958); City Housing Authority v. Berkson, 415 Ill. 159, 112
N.E.2d 620 (1953).
181. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956), see Comments, 8 S.C.L.Q.
457 (1956); 16 M.L.Rzv. 172 (1956); 41 MiN.L.R-T. 219 (1957).
182. Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485, 496
(1904).
183. Ibid.
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guishable upon different constitutional provisions or
former judicial interpretations, proceed upon the theory
that public use is accompanied by the seizure and de-
struction of slum or "blighted" areas, and the disposition
of the land thereafter to private owners for private
purposes is merely incidental. We think this would be a
strained view of the facts in the case sub judice, and we
cannot follow it. The purpose here is not to provide
better, low cost housing to present occupants of the area,
or, indeed, any housing at all; but is to transform it from
a predominantly low class residential area to a com-
mercial and industrial area. It seems to us a grandiose
plan which cannot be dissected and the result of it rea-
sonably said to be incidental 84 [Emphasis added.]
Here, the "taking" for the elimination of slums recognized
by a previous decision as "a proper function of govern-
ment""' was prohibited by looking to the disposition and
not the taking itself. Hence, South Carolina has two choices
under the present interpretation: (1) allow the continued
existence of slum areas or (2) condemn slum areas under
eminent domain but re-use the land publicly. As discussed
earlier, the prohibition of productive re-use of the property
encourages non-productive use of the property. Eminent do-
main proceedings used effectively in other jurisdictions to
increase community development seem to be based on the
interpretation of public needs as interpreted by the legisla-
ture in its authorization. The South Carolina decision does
not look to the need but to the disposition. Further, the
rights of the property owner do not seem to be in point here
since South Carolina recognizes the power of eminent domain;
it is only the application that seems to be wanting in a con-
temporary interpretation of public use.
Probably the antithesis of the Edens decision is the Cannata
v. City of New York case.186 An area designated for eminent
domain proceedings had 75% of the land vacant with the
184. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 573, 91 S.E.2d 280, 282
(1956).
185. E.g., Gohid Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104
A.2d 365 (1954); Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 139
A.2d 476 (Del. 1958).
186. 24 Misc.2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1960), modified and affirmed,
14 App.Div.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1961), affirmed, 11 N.Y.2d
210 182 N.E.2d 395 (1962), cert. den., 371 U.S. 4, (1962). See Comment,
38 NOTR. DA E L.REV. 210 (1963).
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remaining 25% occupied by dwellings in sound and sanitary
condition with no tangible blight. The land was slated for
eminent domain proceedings because of the need for com-
mercial and industrial growth and the availability of rail
transportation on the site. The statute'81 authorizing such
a taking was upheld as constitutional since the plan was
interpreted as valid public use. The Supreme Court of the
United States denied an appeal for absence of a substantial
Federal question. 8 8
It would seem that the point of difference between the
Edens case and the Cannata case hinges on the definition
of public use alone without any reference to the property
owners involved. Both jurisdictions obviously recognized that
the private property owner's rights are subservient to the
sovereign. Since the power is absolute, the employment is
subject only to the constitutional limitations and the judicial
interpretation thereof. Warnings have been issued by courts
that the expanded definition may usurp fundamental prop-
erty guarantees unless curbed definitions result.18 9
It must be remembered that when a question of public use
comes before the court, the court does not determine whether
the taking is public, but whether the legislature might rea-
sonably consider the taking public. No act by the legislature,
then, will be held unconstitutional unless it is obviously in
violation of the will of the people as declared in the funda-
mental law. The problem, therefore, is one for the legislature
and not for the courts.
187. N.Y. Gen. Municipal Law §72-n; recodified, "Urban Renewal
Law," N.Y. Gen. Municipal Law §§500-525 (Supp. 1962).
188. Cannata v. City of N.Y., 24 Misc.2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1960),
modified and affirmed, 14 App.Div.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1961),
affirmed, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395 (1962), cert. den., 371 U.S.
4 (1962).
189. E.g., Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F.Supp. 705 (D.D.C.
1953), "These extensions of the concept of eminent domain, to encompass
public purpose apart from public use, are potentially dangerous to
basic principles of our system of government." at 117 F.Supp. 716; Can-
nata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395 (1962),
"Conceding that the power of eminent domain has been extended to
the elimination of areas that are actually slum, the question . . . is
whether this power can be further extended to the condemnation of
factories, stores, private dwellings, or vacant land which are properly
maintained and are neither substandard nor unsanitary, so that their
owners may be deprived of them against their will to be sold to a
selected group of private developers whose projects are believed by the
municipal administration to be more in harmony with the times." (dis,
senting opinion) 182 N.E.2d at 398.
1963]
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It is interesting to note that the universally accepted gov-
ernmental powers of taxation and policy authority of the
Federal government and the states actually are broader than
eminent domain powers, considering the compensation ques-
tion.190 These powers, as eminent domain powers, should
be viewed in a total view of their purpose: to benefit the
public. The elasticity of governmental powers should not
be viewed as a vice but as a virtue, since their usefulness
should parallel the community needs as the sovereign sees
these needs.'191 Consequently, set definitions of the compo-
nent parts of eminent domain should be avoided. The power
is actually in the hands of the people who are the sovereign
under our democratic system. If their voice, the legislature,
decides to expand or contract the limitations, the result would
seem to be the will of the people.192 The courts have done
nothing more than protect and interpret that need.
190. E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 79
L.Ed. 1593 (1934); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 49 L.Ed. 1085 (1905);
Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
191. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes declared ". . . when
legislatures are held to be authorized to do anything considerably af-
fecting public welfare, it is covered by apologetic phrases like the
police power, or the statement that the business concerned has been
dedicated to a public use. The former expression is convenient to be
sure, to conciliate the mind to do something that needs explanation:
the fact that the constitutional requirement of compensation when
property is taken cannot be pressed to its grammatical extreme; that
property rights may be taken for public purposes without pay if you
do not take too much; that some play must be allowed to the joints
if the machine is to work. But police power is used in a wide sense
to cover, and, as I said, to apologize for the general power of the legis-
lature to make a part of community uncomfortable by a change.
I do not believe in such apologies. I think the proper course is to recog-
nize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless
it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the
United States or of the State, and that courts should be careful not
to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading
into them conceptions of public policy that the particular court mnay
happen to entertain. [Emphasis added.] The truth seems to me to be
that, subject to compensation when compensation is due, the legislature
may forbid or restrict any business when it has a sufficient force of
public opinion behind it." Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,
71 L.Ed. 718, 729 (1927).
192. In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "Nearly all legislation in-
volves a weighing of public needs as against private desires; and like-
wise a weighing of relative social values. Since government is not an
exact science, prevailing public opinion concerning the evils and the
remedy is among the important facts deserving consideration; par-
ticularly, when the public conviction is both deep-seated and widespreadand has been reached after "deliberation. W at, at any paticular time, is
the paramount public need is, necessarily, largely a matter of judgment."
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It is elementary to say that eminent domain powers are
a useful tool in today's contemporary society; but it is neces-
sary that the tool be understood in its application. Like any
tool, it should be exercised with the most benefit to the
master. The people are the masters of the power and if
their will dictates a certain application, the use should be
honored within the constitutional framework. The worst
result of any useful tool is that it may be allowed to become
rusty and, consequently, ineffective, or, conversely, it may
be over used, limiting its further effectiveness.
Accordingly, South Carolina may have permitted the use
of the eminent domain power to become obsolete in relation
to the needs of the time and, conversely, New York may
have forced the use beyond a prudent course of action. The
answers to these suppositions, however, will be found with
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